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Abstract
The New South Wales (NSW) government created the Sydney Metro Authority to design, 
build and operate a completely separate underground Metro rail system to supplement the 
existing  public  transport  network  in  Sydney.  By  the  time  the  NSW  government  abruptly 
cancelled the entire Metro project in early 2010, the Authority had conceived and designed a 
contract  that  was  proceeding  to  procurement.  This  paper  examines  the  nature  of  the 
proposed Sydney Metro contract in relation to its performance framework and compares this 
to the frameworks in current contracts for bus, rail and ferry public transport in NSW. Against 
this background, the paper examines the extent to which the Sydney Metro approach has 
had an impact on subsequent public transport contracts in the context of the literature on 
optimal  contracting  and  optimal  incentives.  The  paper  concludes  that  little  has  been 
implemented,  although  the  other  mode  contracts  now  enable  more  performance 
measurement and incentivisation. In particular, the decision to award contracts to existing 
(and mostly public sector) operators appears to have acted as a brake on developing these 
performance elements. 
1. Introduction
In November 2008,  the New South Wales (NSW) government created the Sydney Metro 
Authority, a new agency tasked with designing, building and operating a completely separate 
underground Metro rail system to supplement the existing public transport network in Sydney. 
The Metro program was progressing to contract negotiations when the NSW government 
abruptly cancelled the entire Metro project in February 2010. 
This  paper  is  concerned  with  the  performance  framework  embedded  (or  otherwise)  in 
contracts between government and transport operators for the provision of public transport 
services.  The first  strand of  this  paper  is  a comparison between the contracts  for  other 
modes  operating  in  the  NSW  metropolitan  area  of  Sydney  to  identify  the  degree  of 
commonality between the contracts  for  existing  modes in  Sydney and the new mode of 
underground metro. A second strand looks at the influence of the Sydney Metro Authority’s 
contract development and considers the implications for future modal contracts in NSW.
A parliamentary information request and the public archiving of the Sydney Metro Authority’s 
records following its dis-establishment has put the approach to the proposed Metro contract 
in the public domain. The generic bus contracts for metropolitan bus services have long been 
in the public domain. The rail and ferry contracts are not currently publicly available (they are 
expected to become available shortly under the Government Information (Public Access) Act  
2009), although some information is available from other sources.
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The next section considers the literature relating to optimal contracts and optimal incentives 
as underpinning the contractual relationship between operators and government in NSW. 
The paper considers the nature of the performance elements of existing modal contracts for 
bus, rail and ferry services in Section 3 and this is followed in Section 4 by an outline of the 
performance framework proposed for the Sydney Metro. This paper recognises that the bus, 
ferry and rail contracts are implemented whereas the Metro has not and may not have been 
implemented in the way portrayed in this paper if  the Sydney Metro project had come to 
fruition. The discussion in section 5 relates issues identified by the optimal contract literature 
to the existing contracts in NSW. 
2. Optimal contracting and optimal incentives
Worldwide, there is an increasing use of  the “public-private partnership”  (PPP) to deliver 
transport and other services. A PPP can be defined as a “contractual agreement between a 
public agency (federal, state or local) and a private sector entity. In addition to the sharing of 
resources, each party shares in the risks and rewards potential in the delivery of the service 
and/or facility” (NCPPP 2011). A broader definition refers to “working arrangements based on 
a mutual commitment (over and above that implied in any contract)  between a public sector 
organisation with any organisation outside of the public sector” (Boivard 2004, p. 199).
When public and private entities ‘blend’ to work together to achieve a particular goal, the 
issue of governance immediately arises. Within private corporations, “corporate governance 
deals  with  the ways  in  which  suppliers  of  finance  to  corporations  assure  themselves  of 
getting a return on their investment” (Shliefer and Vishny 1997, p. 737). Within public entities, 
the issues are a bit more complex; good governance in that context aims to deliver goods 
and  services  cost-effectively  and  efficiently  to  constituents  while  ensuring  adequate 
democratic process and citizen voice (Koppell 2003).
Much of the large literature on private corporate governance focuses on the agency problem 
and  the  related  theory  of  transactions  costs  to  discuss  why  the  firm  exists  and  what 
governance institutions are best suited to ensuring its efficient operation (Coase 1937; Fama 
1980; Williamson 1988). There is an equally large literature on governance within the public 
sector,  where the themes of ‘networked’ and ‘distributed’ oversight and accountability are 
emerging (Bovens et al. 2001).
The main justification for PPPs is that they create a synergy value that public ownership 
alone is unable to tap into. This synergy value is created whenever a combination of parties 
–  involving  government  along  with  private  operators,  and/or  non-profit  organisations  – 
combine to create financial or operational capabilities greater than any one party can provide 
alone (Weihe 2008). 
But as noted above, there is an ‘agency’ problem: private and public parties do not typically 
have  aligned  interests  (in  economic  terms,  public  and  private  ‘objective  functions’  will 
generally differ from one another) and a governance structure must be designed to ensure 
both proper alignment and successful achievement of mutually desired outcomes. 
Contracting  is  the  primary  way  this  agency  problem  can  be  resolved,  if  it  is  designed 
properly. A primary public objective of any contract is (or should be) ‘Value for Money’ (VfM), 
while a primary private objective is profit maximisation. How can a contract be designed to 
ensure  such alignment and then successful  achievement of  contract  goals? The ‘optimal 
contracting’ literature suggests three key questions:
1. Who are the relevant parties to the contract?
2. How can their interests and objectives be aligned in the contract?
3. How will  the contract,  once signed, be overseen and monitored to ensure optimal 
performance?
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With respect to (1), Hensher and Houghton (2005) break down this question by categorising 
the different roles played by parties to the contract: government plays a strategic role; the 
regulator plays a tactical role; and the operator plays an operational role. These are generic 
categories and in reality may be combined in some cases (e.g., a single entity may contain 
both  the  government  and  regulator  role).  A very  useful  aspect  of  this  schema is  that  it 
abstracts away from ‘public’ and ‘private’ to focus on roles that must be accomplished in any 
PPP. Specification of these roles and assignment of responsibilities for them are an important 
starting point to any contract and should be considered explicitly by all contracting parties.
The  answer  to  (2)  involves  a  number  of  dimensions  which  revolve  around  appropriate 
incentives. This paper focuses on two explicit  incentive elements: performance payments 
and penalties (i.e. reward) and risk allocation. But implicit performance incentive structures 
are  also  relevant  and  include  tender  design,  contracting  process,  contract  term  and 
institutional form; these will also be discussed below.
A key finding of  the  literature  is  that  incentive  payments  and bonuses  (or  their  inverse, 
penalties and abatements) are generally especially effective (and better than fixed payment 
schemes) in ensuring good performance in terms of outcomes (Hensher and Houghton 2005; 
Bloomfield 2006). Outcomes, such as improved access, mobility and service, are what any 
contract should aim for. Inputs such as increased spending or outputs such as more trains 
and buses, by themselves, are not desirable. Obviously the details of incentives must be 
carefully worked out and if poorly designed can lead to substandard outcomes.
The specific metrics chosen to award incentives and/or penalties are crucial. Examples of 
perverse incentives and unintended consequences arising from badly designed metrics in 
contracts are rife (Behn and Kant 1999; Skelcher 2005; Bloomfield 2006). Even if a metric is 
conceptually sound, there must be a robust process for measuring whether targets are being 
met and an adequate system for reporting results in a timely manner and to the parties most 
interested in optimal performance. In many if not most cases, this should include the users of 
a facility or service and possibly the general public who directly or indirectly are financing the 
contract itself.
The other side of performance is risk. There are a variety of risk types (revenue, cost, etc.).  
Just as interests of the various parties to the contract should be properly aligned, so should 
risk allocation. As an example, political risk should generally be borne by government, the 
party best able to bear it and most influential over its magnitude and incidence. Revenue risk 
can be more complicated. Uncertainty is part of any contract and it should not always be 
assumed  that  the  operator  should  bear  it  in  its  various  manifestations  completely.  It  is 
important  that  each party should bear  the amount and type of  risk it  is  most  efficient  at 
dealing  with  and  that  risk-bearing  should  not  create  countervailing  incentives  to  those 
contained in performance payments. A simple example of this is a contract which might have 
strong operator performance incentives explicitly but in which the government bears all the 
revenue and cost risk (Quiggin 2005; Ng and Loosemore 2007).
Implicit incentives and risk allocation can work against the explicit contract risk and reward 
provisions if not designed properly. Contract duration is extremely important. Long contracts 
might  transfer  effective  control  of  an  asset  or  service  to  a  particular  party  even  though 
nominal control or ownership might rest with a different party in the actual contract document. 
Long contracts might also reduce incentives for the operator to perform because they provide 
too much security of tenure. Some of this may be ameliorated, however, by having provisions 
subject to review and revision at specified periods (Ortiz et al. 2007; Kwak et al. 2009).
Identifying an ideal set of potential operators and then selecting the best one or several out 
of that set is equally critical. This comes down to the tendering process used, in particular 
whether bids are solicited and selected on a competitive or negotiated basis. The general 
evidence  is  that  competitive  tendering  yields  better  contracting  outcomes  than  non-
competitive (negotiated) ones, though there are exceptions to this general rule (Hensher and 
Stanley 2003).
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More  generally,  institutional  arrangements  are  extremely  important.  With  transport 
privatisation in particular, there is a difference between an actual gain in resources and a 
mere  transfer  of  resources  from  one  account  to  another.  Some  research  on  transport 
privatisation indicates that what are often seen as efficiency gains are really budgetary gains 
to the public authority that are achieved through losses incurred by other groups (Gomez-
Ibanez and Meyer 1993). 
So a question arises: is a government institution (‘public’) naturally better at some activities 
while private institutions are naturally better at others? Is a particular private-public blend 
best for a particular set of circumstances and what might those circumstances be? There is 
no simple answer to this question and it  is not a major focus of the analysis here but is 
nonetheless important, especially when new institutions are being designed to carry out a 
particular contract or venture.
This discussion shades into key question (3), namely ensuring that the terms of the contract 
are satisfactorily carried out as originally intended by all  parties concerned. Even a well-
designed contract can be a failure if not properly implemented. Managing contracts, and in 
particular measuring, monitoring and reporting of performance incentives and payments, is a 
difficult  issue in practice. Private sector investors need to ask questions about how cash 
flows and income are measured. On the public sector side, there is an additional issue about 
defining  the  public  good  and  determining  whether  maximisation  of  shareholder  value  is 
consistent with maximum user value and value for the overall  public.  Maintenance of the 
public interest is a prime concern with any PPP. For any given project, the government must 
have a clear picture of its public objectives, and must devise contracts that ensure that these 
objectives will be achieved (Hodge 2004). 
In general all contracting parties will want, generically, project success. This success consists 
specifically of an assurance that projects will be effectively designed with resulting services 
that will be efficiently implemented to provide a reasonable benefit or return to all intended 
parties. Initial performance measurement along all of these dimensions can help to ensure 
appropriate  alignment  of  public  and  private  benefits,  and  equity  as  well  as  efficiency  in 
financing  and  pricing.  It  can  also  provide  a  basis  for  ongoing  monitoring,  which  can 
potentially help to reduce or avoid shortfalls in any of the performance dimensions, as well as 
misalignment of performance among these various dimensions. 
3. Existing public transport contracts for metropolitan Sydney 
This section considers the contracts for  the public transport modes of bus,  ferry and rail 
which form the network of public transport services in Sydney. Table 3, located in Section 5, 
summarises elements of these contracts. Two other modes of public transport, light rail and 
monorail, are excluded from further consideration because the contents of the contract are 
not in the public domain and because of the very minor role they play in the public transport 
network.  The  light  rail  is  privately  run  following  complicated  contractual  arrangements 
completed in 1994 as a BOOT (Build,  own,  operate for a period of time before transferring 
the asset to government) (Mills 1997), and the same operator now operates the monorail. 
3.1 Bus services
3.1.1 Background
Prior  to  2003,  the  NSW  government  had  contracts  with  87  individual  bus  operators  in 
Sydney. The government set the required service levels, frequency of service and hours of 
operation for regular bus services. The operator retained all farebox revenue and, in addition, 
received a payment from the government for student travel and concessionary travel. In 2003 
the government commissioned a Ministerial Review of Bus services (Unsworth 2004). The 
terms of reference for the review included performance-related objectives including “funding, 
contractual and regulatory arrangements and any legislative changes required to implement 
these improvements” (Unsworth 2004, p. 93).
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In addition to recommending changes to the metropolitan bus contracting areas and revised 
responsibilities for network planning, the review called for a new contracting regime for new, 
larger  metropolitan  contract  areas.  Contracts  were  recommended  to  include  substantial 
performance  elements  and  should  be  won  by  competitive  tendering  on  cost  plus  other 
factors: “service planning skills; on-time running/reliability; environmental history; customer 
relations  activities;  and  workplace  relations,  OH&S  experience  and  proposed  approach” 
(Unsworth 2004, p. 33).  The review proposed that contracts should include standards for 
service quality, including “punctuality and reliability, timetable information, signage, customer 
relations/complaint handling, fleet specifications, and environmental performance” (Unsworth 
2004, p. 34). It was noted that the implementation of the recommendations of the review 
would involve changes to the Passenger Transport Act 1990, as the Act did not give sufficient 
provision for “performance standards and penalties” (Unsworth 2004, p. 91). 
Following  the  final  report,  the  government  accepted  many of  the  recommendations  and 
embarked on a Bus Reform program in 2004. Following enabling legislation amendments in 
2004 and 2005, the 87 contracts with individual operators were rationalised to one contract 
for each of the 15 metropolitan and 10 outer metropolitan contract areas. Where a contract 
area had more than one operator, the contract was made between the government and a 
Management Board representing the relevant operators. 
3.1.2 Generic 2005 bus contract
The metropolitan and outer metropolitan contracts cover the provision of  bus services in 
each contract area for a period of seven years. The current template (often referred to as the 
‘generic’  contract)  for  the  metropolitan  contract  has  two  performance  related  payment 
mechanisms: the Operational Performance Regime (OPR) and the Service Quality Incentive 
(SQI). Neither of these mechanisms has been put into effect. Whilst the contracts for the 
metropolitan and outer metropolitan areas vary in some detail, they are identical in relation to 
the performance  related  mechanisms (NSW Ministry  of  Transport  2005a,  2005b,  2005c, 
2005d). 
The contract sets out the principles of the OPR and the rules for its formulation, calibration 
and  implementation.  The  OPR  measures  reliability  and  punctuality  of  services  through 
reviewing disruption to timetabled services. In addition the contract refers to, but does not 
specify, a cap on bonus and penalty payments. Any disruptions caused by ‘abnormal events’ 
(force majeure and other events beyond the control of the operator) are excluded from the 
measurement process.
The contract states that the Director General may award a SQI payment and sets out the 
measurement  framework  for  the  SQI.  It  contains  six  performance  indicators  with 
corresponding weights, listed in Table 1. The contract does not set out the details of how 
these components will be measured or any information on the likely scale of the payment. 
Patronage growth is incentivised through a Patronage Change Payment which compares 
current year patronage, scaled by type and length of journey, with the previous year. The 
payment operates as a bonus/abatement regime: in cases where there is  a decrease in 
calculated patronage the operator pays a penalty, although these bonuses/penalties can be 
accumulated over the years (NSW Ministry of Transport 2005b).
The contract also specifies four Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) which are proposed in 
the future to assess performance against compliance standards (NSW MoT 2005b). Failure 
to  meet  these  standards  would  be  taken  into  account  in  assessments  associated  with 
contract renewal (NSW MoT 2005a). The KPIs (and associated standards) are complaints 
management (falling numbers and response times), environmental protection (100% drivers 
trained),  safety  (100% drivers  trained)  and  efficiency/productivity  (5-10% improvement  in 
revenue km per driver and total costs per revenue km).
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Table 1 Metropolitan bus contracts: components of the Service Quality Incentive
Aspect of service quality Measure(s) Weight
Customer satisfaction Staff helpfulness and courtesy
Vehicle cleanliness
Provision of Information
Personal Security
Service provision (where services go and when)
Ticket machine availability and performance
Overcrowding
50%
Complaints Volume of complaints
Response time
20%
Co-operation with Other 
Operators and the 
Community
Assessment by DoT through interviews with 
stakeholders and operator
15%
Load standards Periodic reviews by DoT to measure capacity, 
especially at peak loading points
5%
Vehicle presentation Periodic reviews by DoT of vehicle cleanliness and 
compliance
5%
Environmental performance Periodic reviews by DoT of performance against plan 5%
Source: summarised from NSW Ministry of Transport (2005b) p.17-18.
3.1.3 Status
Progress on bus contracting was examined in a report by the Auditor-General NSW (2010c). 
The audit report notes that although the contracts were introduced as planned in 2005 (albeit 
on  the  basis  of  direct  negotiation  rather  than  competitive  tendering),  progress  with 
incorporating performance elements had been slow. At the time of the report in March 2010, 
the government agency was in a position to monitor aspects of performance and quality but 
had not negotiated the structure of bonuses and penalties that would be used in relation to 
these  measures.  Although  existing  contracts  enable  operators  to  be  penalised  for  poor 
performance, no penalties had been applied over the first four years of the contracts.
The audit report lists the six performance measures that were introduced and implemented in 
2009, following a period of consultation which began in 2005: “cost per service kilometre; 
number of complaints; overall satisfaction from customer survey; service reliability; vehicle 
condition; and passenger boardings per service kilometre” (Auditor-General NSW 2010c, p. 
16). Eleven further indicators “important to bus operations and to bus users” (Auditor-General 
NSW 2010c, p. 15) are proposed by the Auditor-General, without which “it is not possible to 
assess the efficiency and effectiveness of metropolitan bus services and it  is much more 
difficult  to identify specific performance improvements and performance failures” (Auditor-
General NSW 2010c, p. 16).
3.2 Ferry services
3.2.1 Background
Most ferry services in Sydney are provided by the state-owned Sydney Ferries Corporation. 
In 2007, the government commissioned an inquiry into Sydney Ferries (Walker 2007). The 
acknowledged dominant purpose of the inquiry was “to report  on action which should be 
taken to improve the ability of the Sydney Ferries Corporation (SFC) to provide safe, efficient 
and customer-focussed ferry services”  (Walker  2007,  p.  3).  The impact  of  the  lack  of  a 
contract  was  highlighted:  “Sydney  Ferries  Corporation  does  not  have  a  contract  with 
Government which sets out the terms by which it should operate. With or without a contract, 
as a State Owned Corporation, SFC cannot be subject to any meaningful penalties for non 
performance or poor performance nor are there any real financial incentives to perform well” 
(Walker 2007, p. 1).  The report  looked at the relationship between SFC governance and 
performance, but cited difficulties with assessing performance, stemming from a lack of a 
performance management framework (Walker 2007, p. 150) and a workplace culture that 
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“significantly  inhibits  the  capacity  of  the  organization  to  achieve  efficiency  and  service 
delivery improvements” (Walker 2007, p. 160).
With regards to contracting,  the Walker report  compared various potential  approaches to 
promoting efficiency and quality through a contract  with private operators,  a state-owned 
corporation  (SOC),  or  a  public-private  partnership.  The  report  recommended  that  “the 
Government  undertake to pay a price  fixed by a service contract  to  a private-enterprise 
corporation for the provision of ferry services pursuant to a service contract as required by 
the Passenger Transport Act 1990 but on a provisional basis, that is, until it proves to be no 
more  expensive  than  a  SOC providing  ferry  services  pursuant  to  a  service  contract  as 
required by the Passenger Transport Act 1990 (Walker 2007, p. 334). 
The  report  also  lists  legislative  changes  that  would  be  required  to  enable  effective 
contracting,  including  provisions  to  enable  the  regulator  to  offer  or  enforce  incentives 
designed to ensure service standards (Walker 2007, p. 125-126). The report does not specify 
the types of standards or levels to be applied to these standards that should be included in a 
performance related regime.
3.2.2 Sydney Ferries contract
Following the Walker report, a market review was commenced in 2008, including a request 
for tender. Benchmarking the results of this exercise with SFC performance data led to a 
decision to sign a seven-year operating contract to SFC in April 2010 (Auditor General NSW 
2010a). The contract is not currently publicly available, but the Auditor-General’s report refers 
to  details  of  the  seven  year  contract  (Auditor-General  NSW  2010b):  “The  new  service 
contract  provides  clear  performance benchmarks  for  Sydney Ferries.  Under  the contract 
Sydney Ferries must continue its reform program, which includes cost reductions through 
restructuring, productivity gains through better work practices and improvements to safety 
and  customer  service”.  The  report  presents  performance  information  and  targets  for  15 
financial and non-financial KPIs (Table 2), but it is not known which, if any, of these KPIs form 
part of the service standards or part of the contractual incentive regimes (Auditor-General 
NSW 2010b).
Table 2 Ferry contract: potential performance indicators
Operational performance Financial performance
Services that run on time (%)
Patronage growth (%)
Number of customer complaints
Number of significant incidents
Number of passenger injuries
Number of sick days taken per employee
Fleet availability (%) 
Vessel reliability (%)
Number of passenger journeys (million)
Patronage growth (%)
Number of fleet failures
Earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and 
amortisation
Operating deficit
Return on average assets (%)
Return on average equity (%)
Source: Auditor-General NSW (2010b).
3.3 Rail services
Rail  services  in  Sydney  are  provided  by  RailCorp  through  the  brand  name CityRail  for 
metropolitan services. There was a Rail Performance Agreement for the period 1 July 2006 
to 30 June 2011 between the Minister for Transport and RailCorp, but a new service contract 
replaced the agreement in 2010. The rail services contract required under the  Passenger 
Transport Act 1990 is not currently publicly available but is expected to be made available 
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under Government Information (Public Access) Act. However, the RailCorp Customer Charter 
(RailCorp  2011)  contains  25  commitments  in  eight  key  areas:  on-time  trains;  manage 
crowding;  fast,  accurate and useful  information;  safe and secure travel;  clean trains and 
stations; fast ticket sales; quick and fair complaints handling; and accessible services and 
facilities.  RailCorp provides a  quarterly  update on commitments on its  website,  although 
there is no publicly reported connection between the Customer Charter and the performance 
element  of  the  rail  services  contract.  The  Independent  Transport  Safety  and  Reliability 
Regulator (ITSRR) (2010) reported on performance and noted a relationship between the rail 
performance agreement and the Customer Charter.
A very public element of RailCorp’s performance has been on-time running, and its definition. 
The commitments are: to run more than 92% of trains on time on all lines, even at the busiest 
times, with less than 0.5% cancelled, and to stop at all scheduled stops at least 99.5% of the 
time. In July 2005, the on-time running benchmark for suburban services changed from three 
minutes and 59 seconds to five minutes. RailCorp publishes its on-time running performance 
daily on its website, as well as weekly, monthly and yearly data. As far as is known, RailCorp 
does not incur penalties or receive bonus payments related to its on-time running.
Under the auspices of ITSRR, Mejia and Lind (2009) conducted a review of best practice in 
rail  contracting,  presumably  with  the  intention  of  setting  some  standards  for  the  (then) 
forthcoming  contract  for  the  operation  of  the  CityRail  network.  The  review sets  out  the 
necessary  elements  of  a  commuter  services  contract  including  a statement  of  scope, 
objectives  and  contract  term; clarity  of  roles  and  responsibilities; service  levels,  quality 
standards  and  requirements  for  integration; and  mechanisms  for  funding,  monitoring, 
reporting,  incentivisation,  dispute  resolution  and  contract  variation. Bonus  and  penalty 
regimes are cited by Mejia and Lind (2009) as a way to encourage contract compliance. 
However,  they question the effectiveness of  these in public sector  contracting where the 
profit motive is not a strong driver. Their research also found that a collaborative relationship 
between purchaser and operator is an important facet of successful contracting.
4. The Sydney Metro contract
4.1 Background
The Urban Transport Statement (NSW Government 2006) introduced the concept of metro 
rail to link high demand corridors to major centres in Sydney and this initiated the process for 
investigating the viability and setting the agenda for metro development in Sydney. On 18 
March 2008 the North West Metro was announced as the initial link in a metro network for 
Sydney but this was deferred in an announcement in November 2008 with a CBD Metro 
being then proposed as a first part of a staged approach to the metro network (Transport 
NSW 2010a). 
A shadow operator was appointed early in the process through a process of open tendering 
to  imitate  the  role  of  an actual  operator  and to  provide the business  plan and  strategy 
underpinning  the  development  of  a  contract  for  actual  provision  of  the  proposed  link 
(Transport NSW 2010a).
The Sydney Metro  contract  information,  as developed by the Sydney Metro Authority,  is 
publicly available (http://www.transport.nsw.gov.au/sites/default/file/metrodocs/).  All  contract 
information described below comes from Schedule 3 of the proposed project deed (Transport 
NSW 2010b) unless otherwise referenced. The Sydney Metro contract was designed for a 
35-year building and operating period by a successful PPP bidder (Transport NSW 2010c). 
The form of the contract was ‘Design, Build, Operate, and Maintain’ (DBOM). The successful 
bidder would have had responsibility for building the metro system (after the tunnels and 
station cavities had been constructed through a separate contract), sourcing and maintaining 
rollingstock and operational systems, operating the metro according to the specifications set 
out in the contract, and handing back the assets to the government at the end of the contract 
period.
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4.2 The performance framework
Consistent  with  the  theory  underlying  PPPs  and  performance  contract  incentives,  the 
government department as contract holder would have controlled the quality of the metro and 
its  services  through  a  performance  related  payment  mechanism.  Parameters  in  the 
mechanism, in particular the bottom line operating fee, were to be proposed by competing 
bidders.  In  the  bids,  these  fees  were  to  be  accompanied  by  design,  construction  and 
operating plans in sufficient detail to enable the government department to assess the long 
term viability of the bidding consortia (Transport NSW 2010c).
The Metro project was abandoned by government during the tendering phase. The following 
description  is  of  a contract  which did  not  come into effect.  The payment  regime for  the 
operating period consisted of an availability payment to which modifications would be made 
in relation to operational performance. The main components of the formula were:
Service Payment = Availability Fee – Service Critical Abatement 
+/- Patronage Payment + Service Quality Payment 
+ Asset Management Payment.
4.2.1 Service critical abatement
The service critical abatement (SCA) would have penalised the operating company in cases 
where it  failed  to  operate  the Metro  according  to  the  specified  availability  and  reliability 
standards. These standards were set out as a timetable, which was in the form of ‘trains per 
hour’ across different daily operating periods. The contract also sets out a process for the 
number of trains per hour to be amended at the behest of the NSW government. In order to 
ensure a regular and effective service within the current timetable, the SCA was composed of 
three measures: service delivery, service reliability and journey time.
Service delivery was measured by the amount of trains run in each of six weekday and three 
weekend operating periods. Payment would be abated for each operating period in which the 
operating company failed to run the specified number of trains. For example, the evening 
period lasted four hours, and 12 trains per hour were specified in each direction. In principal 
abatement would occur if the operating company ran less than 96 trains over the four hour 
period. In practice a small amount of tolerance was built into the contract.
Service reliability was designed to ensure an even supply of metro services across time. It 
was measured by ‘missed headways’. The timetable specification of trains per hour implied 
an average headway for each operating period. In the example of 12 trains per hour, this 
average headway would be five minutes: the service critical abatement would be applied on 
occasions when any headway was above five minutes plus a tolerance of 45 seconds.
The third element of the SCA measured  passenger journey times. The first two measures 
would have helped to ensure a consistent service for passengers. However, they provided no 
incentive for the operating company to run trains at a reasonable speed. In fact, since fuel 
costs increase with greater train acceleration and operating speeds, the operating company 
might  have  had  an  incentive  to  run  the  trains  as  slowly  as  possible.  Hence  this  third 
measure,  which  aggregated  all  journey  times  between  combinations  of  arrival  and 
destination points, and compared this with benchmarked aggregated times. Abatement would 
be imposed if the discrepancy was above a tolerance.
The SCA was to be calculated daily, and its calibration was not linear. Any day with more 
than 99.4% performance, based on a weighted average of the components, would attract 
zero abatement. The marginal level of abatement was greater at high performance levels 
(85% up to 99.4%) than at lower performance levels. The contract also specified a point 
below  which  consistently  poor  performance  would  be  deemed  unacceptable  and  would 
constitute  a default  of  contract  (Transport  NSW 2010c).  The SCA calculation  also made 
provision for various special cases. For example, additional abatement would be caused by a 
service  interruption  (defined  as  any  station  receiving  no  metro  service  in  one  or  both 
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directions in any 15 minute period), and during periods of planned maintenance the level of 
abatement would be reduced.
4.2.2 Patronage payment
The patronage payment (PP), labelled ‘Customer Acceptance and Integration Payment’ in 
the contract documentation, encouraged the operating company to ensure that design and 
operation of the metro was geared towards patronage growth. The payment was assessed 
by measuring actual patronage against a benchmark, which was recalibrated every three 
years. The PP had a maximum upside for the operating company of $2m per annum which, 
as the annual cost for stage 1 of the metro was estimated at $50m (Transport NSW 2010d), 
represents  a maximum upside of  4% of  the  contract  cost.  This  element  of  the payment 
regime was to be the subject of discussion and refinement during the tendering process, and 
reviewed after 10 years of metro operation (see Ortiz et al. 2007; Kwak et al. 2009).
4.2.3 Service quality payment
The service quality payment (SQP) was a sum to be added to the availability payment, to a 
maximum of  $5m  per  annum which,  as  the  annual  cost  for  stage  1  of  the  metro  was 
estimated at $50m (Transport NSW, 2011d), represents a maximum upside of 10% of the 
contract cost. The actual payment was determined through a weighted average of scores on 
twelve service quality KPIs, summarised in Table 3.
Table 3 Components of the Sydney Metro Service Quality Payment
Service Quality Measure Measurement method Weight
Passenger safety Passenger survey 20%
Ride quality Passenger survey 10%
Provision of information during service disruptions Passenger survey 10%
Availability of customer assistance Mystery shopper 10%
Ease of purchasing a ticket Passenger survey 8%
Cleanliness of stations Inspection by third party 8%
Cleanliness of trains Inspection by third party 8%
Evidence of graffiti and vandalism Inspection by third party 8%
Temperatures in stations and trains Operational systems 8%
Availability of escalators Operational systems 4%
Availability of CCTV Operational systems 4%
Availability of lifts Operational systems 2%
Source: Transport NSW (2010b) p 30
Each measure in the SQP was calibrated so that marginal payments were greater at higher 
performance levels.  For example Figure 1, taken from the Metro contract documentation, 
shows  the  profile  for  scores  in  the  customer  survey  on  ‘ease  of  ticket  purchase’.  The 
measure was the proportion of respondents who replied ‘easy’ or ‘very easy’ in a five-point  
scale to the question ‘how easy was it to purchase your ticket?’ If this proportion was less 
than 50% then the KPI would not qualify for payment. A score between 50% and 70% could 
attract up to 20% of the maximum possible payment, and a score over 70% up to 95% would 
earn greater marginal payment for each percentage point improvement.
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Figure 1 Example scoring profile for Sydney Metro service quality
Source: Transport NSW (2010b) p. 37.
Payments were to be made quarterly; in cases where sampling volatility was expected the 
measurement  was  converted  to  a  moving  annual  average.  The  contract  documentation 
includes  a  large  amount  of  detail  on  measurement  methods  and  governance  of  the 
measurement processes, probably for the purpose of transparency. The contract also sets 
out rules for consistently unacceptable service quality performance, which would lead to a 
default (Transport NSW 2010c). 
4.2.4 Asset management payment
The final component of the service payment related to the maintenance of the metro assets. 
The operating company was to be responsible for maintaining these assets to an expected 
condition. The government would assess asset condition through an inspection regime, and 
withhold  a  proportion  of  the  service  payment  if  the  condition  of  any assets  was  not  as 
expected with respect to their asset life cycle. The withheld payment would be paid when the 
faults had been rectified. 
4.2.5 Other payment mechanism provisions
In addition to performance-related payments, the final service payment was subject to two 
further  amendments.  Firstly,  a  ‘Reporting  Failure  Amount’  was  specified  to  penalise  the 
operating  company  if  it  failed  to  provide  auditable  information  in  relation  to  any  of  the 
specified performance measures. Measurement of all of the service critical KPIs and four of 
the  service  quality  KPIs  depended  on  the  operating  company’s  systems.  Secondly,  the 
bidding process allowed the operating company to opt for either a fixed or floating rate for  
calculation of the service payment, since the payment was in part repayment for the initial  
design and construction phases.
5. Discussion
5.1 A comparison of the different contracts
11
Australasian Transport Research Forum 2011 Proceedings
28 - 30 September 2011, Adelaide, Australia
Publication website: http://www.patrec.org/atrf.aspx
Table 4 provides a comparison of the different elements of the contracts identified in the 
different sections above. The four modal contracts (three implemented and one proposed) 
were designed to meet differing circumstances. In particular, the operating environments of 
the four  modes had markedly  different  histories  and this  naturally  will  have affected the 
approach to contracting. The Sydney Metro project had no antecedent organisational issues 
to be taken into account:  it  was effectively a ‘greenfield’ project.  The appointment of  the 
shadow operator and the creation of an almost ‘arms length’ separate Authority suggests that 
there  was  an  intention  to  start  anew  in  the  development  of  a  contract  and  operating 
environment.  In  contrast,  contracts  for  the  three  existing  modes  were  subject  to  prior 
government or independent inquiries before implementation: the Unsworth review for buses 
and the Walker review for ferries. Although no formal review has been found for rail,  rail 
operations and performance had been subject to annual reviews by the Independent Pricing 
and Regulatory Tribunal in fare determinations and ITSRR. 
Table  4  shows  some key differences  between the  contracts.  Only  buses  were  not  in  a 
monopoly operation situation. Whilst the contract length for the Sydney Metro was proposed 
as 35 years, those for existing modes have been much shorter at 7 years. The nature of the 
contracts is different too with the metro contract being a DBOM and the others resembling 
operating only contracts: this will undoubtedly have had an impact on contract design. The 
stark  difference  highlighted  by  this  table  is  the  clear  specification  of  the  Metro  contract 
elements in contrast to the contracts for the other modes. Table 3 also highlights similarities 
and shows that there are greater similarities between the contracts for rail and ferry, as state-
owned assets as compared to the mixed ownership structure observed in the bus industry 
and the private ownership proposed for Metro.
5.2 Performance frameworks and relationship to optimal contracts
A theme of this paper is the degree of integration of transport contracting across the four 
modes within NSW in their approach to performance specification and incentives. If this is 
the case, then some evidence of sequence would be expected: the more recent contracts 
were developed in  the knowledge of  what  had gone before and therefore would contain 
some  evidence  of  learning  from  the  earlier  ones.  The  sequence  for  the  four  contracts 
considered here is: bus (2005); metro (2009); ferry (2010); and rail (2010). The evidence of 
section 3 and section 4 suggests that there are significant differences between the existing 
mode contracts and the proposed contract for metro. These are discussed in turn below. 
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Table 4 A comparison of the contracts for Bus, Rail, Ferry and proposed Metro in NSW (as of 2011)
Comparison Bus Rail Ferry Metro (proposed)
Description
No. of contracts 15 metropolitan 1 1 1
Term 7 years (2005-2011) 7 years? (2010-2016) 7 years (2010-2016) 35 years 
Procurement process Negotiated Negotiated Negotiated Competitive tender
Basis of contract Service operating, vehicle 
maintenance
Service operating, 
infrastructure and 
rolling stock 
maintenance
Service operating, vehicle 
maintenance
Design, Build, Operate, Maintain
Contract originator NSW government NSW government NSW government NSW government
Contract State Transit Authority and 
private operators (eg Busways, 
CDC, Forest, Area 4 
Management Co)
RailCorp Sydney Ferries Corporation Private operator, probably a consortium 
of private companies to provide 
necessary skills
Asset ownership Private and state-owned State-owned State-owned Private with provision for transfer to 
State ownership at end of contract
Performance Elements
Reliability (service critical 
abatement)
Bonus/abatement provisions in 
generic contract but not 
currently implemented
Unknown but unlikely Unknown but unlikely Non-linear daily abatement regime
-100% to 0%
Patronage payment Generic contract provides for 
bonus/abatement regime. 
Varies by operator
Unknown but unlikely Unknown but unlikely 0% to 4% (estimated)
Service quality payment Provision made in contract but 
not implemented
Unknown but unlikely Unknown but unlikely 0% to 10% (estimated)
Incentive as % of contract value Not known Not known Not known -100% to +14% (estimated)
Asset maintenance No Unknown but unlikely Unknown but unlikely Yes
Reporting of operating 
performance
Not public On-time running on 
website (by line, by 
week, by time period)
Annual Report
Annual Report Not known
Reporting of customer 
satisfaction
Public Public Public Not known
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5.2.1 The nature of the contract
The  Unsworth  review (Unsworth  2004)  recommended  competitive  tendering  for  the  bus 
contracts subsequently introduced in 2005. The government took the view that the public 
interest would be better served by a negotiated contract process that took account of existing 
operators in each area. Performance in these new contracts was proposed as a yardstick for 
determining whether future contracts would be negotiated or put out for competitive tender. 
Competitive tendering was similarly proposed for ferries (Walker 2007), but a market review 
in advance of the contract preparation concluded that the private sector could not match the 
existing public sector operator (SFC) on a combination of price and quality. This was subject 
to debate in Parliament where the opposition (now the NSW government) identified their 
intention would be to franchise ferry services (NSW Parliamentary Hansard, 22 June 2010). 
On 11 May 2011, the new government announced that they were to start this process (NSW 
DoT  2011).  In  the  case  of  ferries  there  was  also  considerable  public  opposition  to 
‘privatisation’ especially a campaign built around Sydneysiders’ sentimental feelings towards 
the long-standing harbour services (see for example www.saveoursydneyferries.org.au ). As 
a  special  case,  however,  the  NSW  government  did  undertake  a  competitive  tendering 
process for the separate fast ferry service connecting Manly and Sydney CBD. In contrast, 
the Sydney Metro contract was conceived to be a competitive tender process and there is no 
evidence, even though the contract has not been implemented, that the NSW government 
had intention to vary this aspect. 
The current Rail Clearways infrastructure program is designed to give separate pathways for 
freight and passengers and allow the sectoring of services. This would allow a future NSW 
government to create separate infrastructure and operating contracts in the future as has 
been common in European railways.
However,  the  focus of  this  paper  is  on the performance elements of  the  contracts.  The 
success of the performance incentive regimes depends on a number of factors and these are 
discussed in the next sections.
5.2.2 Time and duration of contracts
The form of any contract has an effect on the approach towards performance. The design-
build-operate-maintain  (DBOM)  form of  the  Metro  contract  –  possible  because  it  was  a 
greenfield  contract  –  meant  that  operating  performance  (reliability  and  quality)  could  be 
influenced and potentially enhanced during the design and build stages before any services 
were run. As the other three contracts are essentially operate-maintain or operate only in 
form,  their  performance  frameworks  need  to  take  into  account  legacy infrastructure  and 
vehicles which act as constraints to potential performance for example, through bottlenecks 
and unreliable vehicles.
DBOM contracts by their nature need to take a longer term approach, not only to allow the 
infrastructure to be built but to enable the supplier to recoup capital costs, through either the 
fare box or government payments. This explains why the Metro contract was for 35 years, 
compared with 7 years for bus, ferries and rail. But the length of contract does of course 
have an impact on asset ownership issues. For Metro, ownership of the assets would be 
vested in the NSW government and be used by the operator for the duration of the contract. 
As  state  owned  assets,  the  ownership  of  ferries,  trains  and  the  part  of  bus  operations 
provided by the State Transit Authority were in public ownership at the time of contract issue. 
However, the asset ownership aspects of the bus contracts with private operators are not 
clear: operators owned their own vehicles and bus depots at the start of the contract but 
have received funding for new vehicles under the contracting regime. The long term status of 
vehicles and depots and how these could/would be treated if contracts were to change hands 
is the subject of ongoing discussion.
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5.2.3 Incentives
The size of  the potential  bonuses and abatements in  relation to the overall  value of  the 
contract will have an impact on an operator’s ability and willingness to fund quality services. 
The survey of European urban transport contracts identifies a wide variation, from 0% up to 
21% (European Commission 2008). The majority of contracts have provision for termination 
and so in principal there is potential for 100% abatement. The European Commission study 
found the maximum operator risk was 21% of operating payments if normal operations are 
assumed. In comparison, the Metro contract proposed a situation where there was potential 
for  100% abatement  on any day with accompanying discussion estimating that  potential 
bonuses were of the order of 14% of the contract. The size of the incentive or abatement is 
not clear in the other contracts, even where private bus operators are involved. 
It  must be understood that contracts need to recognise that the operator and contracting 
authority will have different objectives. As the literature identifies, the private operator will be 
driven by returns to their stakeholders, in particular profit-driven dividends to shareholders. In 
the case of a public sector operator, the difference is more subtle but will still exist. A large 
public sector operator may, for example, be as much interested in protecting its monopoly 
position as if it was in the private sector and less interested in providing quality services for 
customers.  These asymmetries  in  expectations  between parties  require  detailed  contract 
drafting.  In  particular  there needs to be a clear  understanding as to what  is  required at 
signing and a detailed mechanism for reaching agreement for those issues to be agreed 
post-signing. The Metro contract appears to be more precise in its specification of the detail 
than the other modal contracts with little left to be agreed post-contract signing. In contrast, 
the bus contracts left a good deal to be agreed later for performance related elements and 
there is evidence that progress has been slow.
Successful contracting also depends on the degree to which the mechanisms in the contract 
accurately reflect stakeholder expectations for passenger experience. Assuming that market 
research has been successfully carried out,  it  is likely that an incentive regime based on 
measures of  outcome is  more likely to  match customer needs than one based on input 
measures. Outcome measures also transfer more risk to the contract holder by recognising 
that perceptions of the customer may be influenced by more than operational measurements. 
Of  the  four  modal  contracts,  it  is  clear  that  the  Metro  contract  was  the  most  precisely 
specified in relation to performance and more related to output measures. 
In addition, the KPIs used in the incentive regime must be carefully balanced to ensure that 
the complex – and sometimes conflicting – needs of  all  stakeholders are met.  Over  the 
period of the contract the operator will  be incentivised to do anything possible (within the 
spirit of the contract) to maximise its own objectives. This may be at variance to the needs of 
other  stakeholders.  For  example,  if  a  contract  were  to  focus  on  a  single  performance 
measure such as on-time running, the operator has an incentive to amend the timetable in a 
way that would ensure high scores on the measure. Moreover, 100% performance on this 
measure would not necessarily lead to a positive passenger experience.
5.2.4 Risk
In a well defined contract, the incentive regime will be clear as to how the risk is allocated 
between the contracting authority and operator. Performance attributes which attract bonus 
or abatement payments provide the allocation of risk. The Metro contract put most of the risk 
onto the operator: although there was a cap on quality bonus payments which limited the risk 
of additional payments to the government, the abatement regime for the operator was total. 
In  the  bus  contracts,  there  is  provision  for  the  government  and  operator  risks  to  be 
symmetrical with regard to patronage growth, for a bonus only regime in relation to service 
quality but with a cap on bonus and penalty payments for operational performance. As the 
literature identifies,  allocating risk between a government contracting authority and public 
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sector operator may not be appropriate, as the payment of bonuses and abatements could 
result simply in transfer payments between the operator and government.
6. Conclusion
The discussion in this paper concentrates on the performance frameworks of the contracts 
for four different modes in Sydney. It is acknowledged that these contracts will have some 
mode specific and some location specific aspects.  Nevertheless,  there are some general 
conclusions from comparing contracts within the same location which are not possible with a 
comparison of same mode contracts between locations. 
In NSW, where there have been independent inquiries prior to contracts being signed, these 
have recommended competitively tendered contracts. However, for bus contracts there has 
been no public explanation of why these recommendations were not implemented. In the 
case  of  ferries,  a  market  testing  process  fulfilled  this  role  and  led  to  the  negotiation  of 
contracts with the incumbent, state owned operator. In contrast, the Metro contract was in the 
process of being competitively tendered when the Metro was cancelled, suggesting the NSW 
government was not averse to competitive tendering per se. It is an open question as to 
whether negotiated contracts have provided as good an outcome for passengers in NSW as 
compared to a competitively tendered alternative. 
The  contracting  literature  suggests  that  better  contracts  will  have  a  close  relationship 
between  the  objectives  of  the  contracting  agency  and  the  detailed  workings  of  the 
performance incentive mechanism. This requires a contracting environment where there is 
trust and dialogue between the parties and this in turn depends on the nature of the contract. 
More important perhaps is that contracts need to make responsibilities clear if integration and 
co-ordination  is  to  be successful.  The experience of  London Underground and Metronet 
shows  how quickly  a  breakdown  of  communication  can  lead  to  contract  difficulties  with 
adverse outcomes for passengers (Transport for London 2008).
The  chronology  of  the  contracts  for  Sydney  also  reveals  evidence  of  experience  being 
transferred between the different contracting exercises, with concepts in the bus contracts on 
reliability, quality and patronage incentives also being part of the proposed Metro contract. 
However,  there are also significant  differences:  the performance framework proposed for 
Metro  is  clearly  specified  and  largely  outcome  based  with  better  specified  reporting 
arrangements than any of the other contracts. Whilst this may have been driven by the need 
to provide a contract that could withstand 35 years, it  is clear that this clarity in contract 
delivery for performance frameworks has not been integrated into contracts formulated post 
Metro. In the run up to the renewal of the expiring bus contracts for metropolitan NSW, there 
is a need to wait and see if the experience of clear and largely outcome-based performance 
measures, as proposed in the Metro contract, will be integrated or ignored.
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